Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan (eds), Non-Western International Relations Theory. Perspectives on and beyond Asia

Reviewed by AJR Groom
University of Kent and Canterbury Christ Church University

The field is broadening. First was the assertion that International Relations Theory (IRT) was an American discipline, if it was anything at all, since many denied its academic status. The generous conceded that it might be ‘Anglo-Saxon’ acknowledging a peripheral source of the field, namely, the UK. Now that has all changed. The International Studies Association in the United States has a very considerable non-American participation. Various universities the length and breadth of Europe have thriving schools of IRT from Turkey to Portugal and Norway to Italy. Journals in North America and Europe flourish, Conferences abound. No longer do Europeans have to go to the US to meet at ISA, they have their own conferences – national (EISA), regional (CEEISA) or pan European (EISA). Likewise they have their journals not least this one (ERIS) and the renowned European Journal of International Relations. The transatlantic development of International Relations as a discipline is well-established and has long disposed of the notion that there is no International Theory as Martin Wight so famously claimed. IRT is alive, well and burgeoning, especially in Europe.

But all of this reflects an essentially Westphalian world dominated by sovereign states, and the ‘Other’ beyond Europe is ignored, as Europe used to be, to the detriment of scholars the world over. Changes are, however, coming along at a pace. Not only are there studies of IR in Latin America, Africa and Asia but a scholarly association, the World International Studies Committee (WISC), to encourage such developments, has taken root. The volume under review is part of this tendency not surprisingly since both the Editors have been advocates of WISC.

The papers in Acharya and Buzan’s edited volume were discussed at a Conference at the Nanyang Technological University in Singapore in 2005 and six of the chapters were first published in the journal International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 7, No. 3. The focus is on South, South East and East Asia and the authors have for the most part a foot in the Westphalian world and the other in Asia. They are therefore in a good position to explain the one to the other.

The Editors agree Western IRT is “massively dominant” (p. 16) and develop this observation into five blunt propositions.

1. Western IRT has discovered the right path to understanding IR.
2. Western IRT has acquired hegemonic status in the Gramscian sense.
3. Non-Western IR theories do exist, but are hidden.
4. The West has a big head start, and what we are seeing is a period of catching up.
The Editor’s are looking through the Western end of the telescope but what does IRT look like from the opposite end? Proposition three is the interesting question and the book provides some answers.

Like in so many different spheres IR in China has recently made some impressive advances. Prof Yaqing Qin, of the China Foreign Affairs University, chronicles this great leap forward and promises more, including IRT. Nevertheless, there is a “lack of awareness of ‘international-ness’” (p. 36). Part of this is due to the observation that the traditional tributary system is not an inter-state system, thus insofar as IRT is concerned the starting point is different from that of Western IR. But this insightful and sophisticated analysis points to traditional philosophical traditions that can be applied to the contemporary world. Indeed, in several chapters the strength of traditional philosophy is seen as a resource that can be used not only by scholars in that culture but by others as well – not just China, but India, Japan and the Islamic world as well.

Takashi Inoguchi has for long acted as an interpreter of Japanese thought for Western scholars. His response is a qualified ‘yes’ to the role of IRT in Japan. He identifies four distinctive magic intellectual currents – Staatslehre, historicism, Marxism and positivism. Interaction with European scholars goes back at least to the interwar period. More generally Japanese theorists are well-informed and comprehensive in their attitudes and home grown.

Korea, like Japan has a large constituency of IR scholars, and unlike Japan they tend to be US trained and not adept at IRT. There really is an element of cloning as is the case in India despite a rich philosophical background. Unlike Korea, India does not have a critical mass of scholars in one place apart from JNU. Sadly Gandhi, Kantilya, non-alignment count for little in the context of IRT as Prof Behera points out. As she comments there is no conception of IR in India vis-à-vis the other social sciences and history. This is also a characterisation of Southeast Asia. However matters may change given that this conference took place in Singapore.

The physical setup of Indonesian universities is not a fructuous one for research, yet as Leonard Sebastian and Irman Lanti suggest, there is a traditional base from which IRT could develop especially in Java (see p. 58 et seq.). While Indonesia may be the largest Muslim country in terms of population the Islamic world is broader than that. Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh explores this Islamic worldview and IRT in a sophisticated analysis. She has many insights to offer about religions, culture and identity, a topic on which Iran has taken a lead.

There is much of interest in this volume and much that can be learned. It is a peephole to the world of IRT in the ‘Other’ which little by little is being translated so that IRT will be less parochial and the better for it.
Daisuke Akimoto, Japan as a ‘Global Pacifist State‘: Its Changing Pacifism and Security Identity

Reviewed by Takashi Inoguchi
President, University of Niigata Prefecture
Professor Emeritus, University of Tokyo

The book under review is one of those works which examine Japanese foreign policy during the post-Cold War years with some key concepts pointing the way to the future. Such key concepts include a normal country, a global civilian Power, a pacifist state, a middle Power, a global pacifist state and a global ordinary Power. A normal country was first used when the US and others wanted to see Japan assist them in those situations where Japan said no. A global civilian state was coined by Hanns Maull at a time when the cold war was over and no revisionist Power was on the horizon. Yoichi Funabashi from Asahi Shimbun followed him. A pacifist state has been a canon to two thirds of Japanese citizens since 1945. A middle Power is used by Yoshihide Soeya and others focusing on human security concept. A global ordinary Power is used by Takashi Inoguchi and Paul Bacon whereby they mean an ordinary country globally grown economically and in terms of responsibilities. A normal country is the key concept to call for a more tightly aligned defence posture and capability in relation to the United States. A pacifist state is the key concept whereby Japan has registered zero war-related death for the 70 years since 1945. A middle Power is the key concept whereby Japan renounces the status of one of the big Powers and seeks to sustain world order as one of the middle-sized stakeholders. A global pacifist state is the key concept the author of this book uses to denote a globally proactive state for peace often in association with the United Nations. It may be called a stakeholder of world order with a pacifist bent. This is unlike an old version of a pacifist state which has an element of isolationism and of being a free rider.

Daisuke Akimoto is well-versed in American theories of international relations. He freely examines a number of key foreign policy events since 1989 using such IR jargons as classical realism, neorealism, classical liberalism, neo-liberalism, negative and positive pacifism, defensive and offensive realism. What he has done is to examine such key events as peace keeping operations in Cambodia (1992), peace building operations in East Timor (2001), the war on terror (2001) in the light of

1 Hanns Maull, ‘Germany and Japan; The New Civilian Power’, Foreign Affairs, winter, (1990/91).
3 Yoshihide Soeya, Masayuki Tadokoro and David A. Welch (eds), Japan as a ‘Normal Country’: A Nation in Search of its Place in the World? (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011).
changing pacifism and security identity. His analytical narratives are well-documented and clearly presented.

His global pacifist state concept is best understood by a glance at Diagram 1: Global Pacifist State on page 237. Therein the global pacifist state sits in the middle first on the normal state versus the pacifist state spectrum and second on the US ally versus UN peace keeper dimension. His explanatory scheme and his narratives fit well since 1989 when the Cold War ended until 2003 when the Iraq war erupted. Japanese pacifism changed from negative to positive somehow adapting to global change and while the constitutional ban on use of force for resolving international disputes and other matters was also moderated.

A question arises from 2012 onwards when China has become very assertive at least as seen from the Japanese perception. The challenge of China in 2012 is comparable to that of Cambodia in 1991, or that of the war on terror in 2001. Whether the author’s scheme remains intact or not remains to be seen especially when Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s collective self-defence push has been brought in to raise the question of Japanese pacifism and security identity. The Abe cabinet decision on collective self-defence made on July 1, 2014 justifies itself on the basis of three prerequisites and eight illustrative contingencies when Japanese Self-Defence Forces are allowed to go abroad to carry out their collective defence assignment. Its important background is that some two thirds of Japanese citizens are against Constitutional revision especially of article 9. The previous interpretation of the Japanese cabinets on collective self-defence is that Japan has the right to carry out collective self-defence but is not allowed to exercise collective self-defence. Therefore the Abe cabinet decision presents a big departure from the past 70 years.

The three prerequisites are: 1) that armed attacks against those countries which have close relations with Japan present manifest and clear dangers to the nation’s life, freedom, and the right for pursuit of happiness; 2) that there are no other adequate means to protect Japanese nationals; 3) that it is a minimum necessary exercise of force. Eight illustrative contingencies where an exercise of force is impossible unless the exercise of collective self-defence is permitted are: 1) to protect US ships under attack; 2) to destroy missile attacks against United States over Japan; 3) to protect US ships engaged in Japan’s neighbouring space when the United States mainland is attacked; 4) to protect civilian ships with international cooperative schemes; 5) to protect US transport ships which carry Japanese nationals abroad; 6) to investigate coercively those ships navigating towards attacking countries; 7) to protect US ships when ballistic missiles are discharged; 8) to destroy mines. In the parliamentary session of spring 2015 the government is planning to legislate relevant laws with a parliamentary majority (with a junior coalition partner New Komeito and possibly with some right-wing and centre-right smallish parties) kept in both houses. Since it represents a big departure from the past, the spring 2015 session of the National Diet is expected to be very volatile, possibly triggering some politically destabilising momentum. Seen this way, the Inoguchi / Bacon analysis of Japanese security identity that we might well witness that of a global ordinary Power during the period between 2005–2020, looks prescient.

Two factors need to be considered in assessing the author’s argument in the book. First, opinion polls inform us that Japanese citizens are against Prime Minister

Takashi Inoguchi and Paul Bacon, op. cit.
Abe’s collective security policy line by 58% (Mainichi poll, June 30, 2014) and by 50% (Nikkei poll, June 30, 2014). Second, since Chinese assertiveness seems to show no sign of abating for some time to come, whether Japanese citizens stand firm on the global pacifist state line, as polls suggest that they do, or they adapt to the global normal state line remains to be seen.

How I myself see the picture of changing pacifism and security identity can be seen in Inoguchi.

---


Thierry Balzacq and Frédéric Ramel (eds), Traité de relations internationales

Reviewed by Noé Cornago
University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU)

A leading continental publisher in the field of social sciences, Les Presses de Sciences Po adds, with this impressive volume, not only an outstanding reference to its prestigious catalogue, but also a particularly significant one in the French context. It reveals its willingness to take another step further in the recognition of International Relations (IR) as an autonomous scholarly field worthy of the greatest academic and editorial interest, in the francophone context and beyond. In so doing, it follows the path of other prestigious international publishers such as SAGE and Oxford University Press, who in recent years have also successfully launched similar volumes, equally impressive. It is worth noting that the project also had the support of the Universities of Namur, Paris Sud-11, and Jean Moulin-Lyon-3, which is surely the most ambitious editorial collective work in the history of French IR scholarship.

Edited by Thierry Balzacq and Frédéric Ramel – two of the most active and original scholars in the current French IR community – the Traité de relations internationales is an ambitious and carefully designed academic project. Indeed, it responds perfectly to what such an academic project is expected to achieve. Systematic and well organised, it offers an impressive range of topics through fifty comprehensive and up-to-date contributions, written by more than sixty authors from all over the world. The volume combines senior and junior academics from very distant corners of IR scholarship, highly reputed world-class academics and less-well-known but committed scholars located across the globe, from Waco to Beirut, and from Sydney to Ouagadougou. When considered altogether the outcome is indicative of a laudable and successful commitment with academic rigour and theoretical pluralism. More specifically, the book is organised in four parts.

In Part I, Contextualisation, Balzacq and Ramel vindicate their francophone allegiances but they do it demonstrating that they are perfectly aware of its heterogeneity. Bearing this in mind they invite the reader to examine the respective achievements from France to Canada, Lebanon to Vietnam or Belgium to Cameroon, amongst other settings. But they also show a clear determination to escape from any form of cultural isolationism, offering thus a particularly reflective approach to the problematical articulation of francophone IR with the wider constellation not only in the North Atlantic but also beyond. Being the first attempt to adopt such an approach in the IR field, despite its possible limitations, – for example the lack of attention to China or Latin America – this is surely a courageous decision that deserves recognition and praise. All the chapters have their distinctive value. Noteworthy are Dario
Noé Cornago: Review of „Traité de relations internationales“

Battistella’s inquisitive piece on the *carrefours* on IR in France, A.J.R. Groom’s unpretentious account of IR in the UK, Grenier and Sjolander’s very reflective analysis of the Canadian case, Romer on the past and present of Russian IR, and Ngoie Tshibambe’s captivating narrative about the origins and evolution of IR scholarship in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The result, despite their diverse tone and scope, is a range of particularly interesting insights on the diverse country-specific sociologies of knowledge affecting academic life all over the world. As Balzacq and Ramel regret in the introduction, it was precisely the uncontrollable development of these contextual factors in the Maghreb and Machrek in recent years that explains the lack of contributions from these areas of the Arab world to this volume.

**Part II, Production**, tries to analyse what the authors call the ‘disciplinary universes of IR’, or in other words how international relations are studied from disciplines other than IR itself. The chapters are dedicated respectively to ‘Law’, ‘Economics’, ‘Geography’, ‘History’, ‘Mathematics’, ‘Philosophy’, ‘Public Policy Analysis’, ‘Psychology’ and ‘Sociology’. Although all of them offer very compelling accounts of the contributions that these disciplines bring to a better understanding of international relations, the reader has the feeling that perhaps such a generous attention to all these disciplines may serve to relativise IR’s own academic achievements and cultivated cross-disciplinarity.

**Part III, Organization**, offers a substantial overview of a number of sub-disciplines, such as ‘Conflict analysis and resolution’, ‘Public diplomacy’, ‘International political economy’, ‘International law’, ‘Ethics and IR’, ‘Security Studies’, ‘Strategic Studies’, ‘Political psychology and IR’, and ‘Environmental Studies and IR’. Although some of them look like other similar readily available introductions in English to these fields of research, some others, particularly those more inspired by francophone contributions to social sciences and humanities have a distinctive flavour of novelty for other readers.

Finally, **Part IV, Transmission**, displays a set of interesting but heterogeneous contributions devoted to examining diverse aspects related to the diffusion of knowledge in different contexts: the case for undergraduate and graduate teaching of IR; the value of innovative methodologies based on the internet and simulation technologies; the state of specialised publications in the French language; the institutionalisation of the IR academic community in Europe since its initial steps with the ECPR Standing Group of International Relations to the recent launching of EISA; the role of IR experts at the service of international think-tanks or as policy advisors for governments; the challenge to the IR community of the global media-sphere. The volume concludes with a Post-face authored by Helen Milner in which she aptly summarises in a simple descriptive tone its rationale and contents.

The *Traité de relations internationales* represents in sum an impressive effort, in which both Balzacq and Ramel, as editors of a complicated enterprise, have succeeded – with the collaboration of more than sixty contributors – in producing a singular piece of scholarly work which, in their own words, aims to ‘make us look further afield’. Of course, being such a big challenge, there are many possible things that some readers will surely miss, such as the lack of attention to Post-Structuralism, despite the undisputable French pedigree of this increasingly influential branch of IR scholarship, or the omission of any relevant reference to the French tradition of War Studies known as ‘polémologie’, or the forgetting of the French origins of contemporary discussion on Post-Colonial IR Theory. But even so, we can say that
this impressive volume suggests at least two different readings. On the one hand, one particularly fitting for both undergraduate and graduate students wishing to acquire a basic but nuanced knowledge about the sub-fields of IR, as well as for instructors looking for suitable materials of quality for their classroom reading assignments in a wide variety of possible courses. On the other hand, a completely different and surely even more stimulating one, through which the inquisitive reader will discover and find between the lines many unexpected and interesting aspects not only about francophone IR, but about global IR scholarship in its entirety. As aptly formulated by Bertrand Badie in his Preface, against the presumptuous positivist ambition of US mainstream IR scholarship: ‘La francophonie’ has a touch of its own. What remains unclear nonetheless, in view of the huge diversity contained in the cultural constellation represented by the francophone world, is what this particular touch may entail. Faced with this challenge the *Traité de relations internationales* offers a wide variety of means by which the interested reader may find a number of stimulating clues.
Henrik Breitenbauch, *International Relations in France. Writing between discipline and state*  

Reviewed by Philippe Bonditti  
University of Kent, Brussels, and Sciences Po, Paris

While the field of study known as International Relations keeps being questioned about the specificity of its object of research that is, about what is likely to constitute IR as a proper academic discipline – a specific, institutionally established and socially recognised domain of scientific knowledge –, the book *International Relations in France. Writing between discipline and state* is less a decisive contribution to the (political) sociology of knowledge, than an original contribution within what the author calls the ‘meta-IR debate’ concerned with the nature, limits and character of IR. As stated by the author himself right at the beginning of the book, its aim is to answer the question of how and why the French tradition of studying International Relations (surprisingly capitalised) is different from what he calls the transnational-American discipline (p. 2).

Thus formulated, the question assumes two implicit (strong) choices that are worthy of note in the first instance as they drive the whole coherence of the book as much as they seem to have driven the author’s research. The first is that IR actually exists as a proper and already established discipline – especially in the English speaking world, and second that something that could be called a ‘French tradition of IR’ actually exists within IR although it is relatively little institutionalised in France, and even less ‘into’ the transnational-American IR discipline.’ Such (silent) choices are especially telling about the domain of knowledge and the questions in relation to which the author wants to situate his argument – that is, not the philosophy but the sociology of science/knowledge, and more specifically the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK, often associated with such names as Stephen Woolgar and Andrew Pickering). The author’s questions therefore have nothing to do with either the categories of thinking and analysis that would enable the very possibility of studying and even naming something (like the) ‘international’, or – as historical epistemology would suggest – the object of knowledge and the concepts involved in the study of such an object. His questions have to do with what has lead ‘French IR’ to a situation characterised by a relatively weak institutionalisation in France and a low degree of integration into transnational-American IR.

Built on a relatively good knowledge of the French research and education system – with only a few minor mistakes (i.e. the agrégation is not required to become a CNRS researcher contrary to what is stated on p. 57; the *Revue Internationale et Stratégique* was founded in 1991 and not in 1998 as stated on p. 63), the argument developed is interesting, and the approach somehow original. It is, the author argues,
the typically French format of dissertation – as opposed to the ‘ideal-type/IMRD model (as for Introduction, Method, Results, Discussion) of modern social science article’ derived from Baconian empiricism (p. 79) – that has blocked the development of a specifically French IR tradition and its recognition at the international level. Coupled with the ‘reader-responsible’ writing style, presented as another French distinctive feature (as opposed to the English ‘writer-responsible’ practice of writing), dissertation slowed down the integration of French IR into transnational-American IR which, at the same time, was converging much faster towards that same IMRD model.

The most interesting part of the argument is when the author connects the historical emergence of dissertation as a legitimate form of expression to the socio-genesis of the state in France showing how the former worked as a mechanism of French elites’ social reproduction. This dimension of the argument is more explicitly developed in chapters 4 and 5 – by far the most interesting chapters in my view – where the book’s subtitle Writing between discipline and state, takes its full meaning. Overall, the argument developed in the book, especially when it points to the low degree of integration of French IR into transnational-American IR, would have deserved that the author pay more attention to language teaching – which, until the 1990s, has been relatively under-estimated in France –, as well as to the division between research and education that have long structured the French academic field.

To put forth his argument, the author deploys a very eclectic approach, both qualitative and quantitative, ‘comparative in spirit’ (transnational-American, Scandinavian and French IR) and which combines elements of historical sociology (mainly drawn from the works of Charles Tilly and Norbert Elias) with bourdieuan sociology (on Language and symbolic power especially), also with reference to, and inspirations drawn from the sociology of (scientific) knowledge and even Foucault’s archaeological insights on discourse. Yet, such an eclecticism is only possible at the cost of conceptual and theoretical rigour – the superficiality of the overall theoretical framework being hardly hidden by the extreme rigour with which the author exposes the structure of his argument.

Indeed, the reader is constantly reminded of the structure and purpose of each chapter of the book (which certainly reflects the English writer-responsible tradition of writing in which the author is himself undoubtedly rooted), but such a clarity is made to the detriment of a clear, and perhaps necessarily deeper discussion about how to articulate these different lines of inspiration. Given that the author’s great ambition is not only to “contribute to the meta-IR debate and the new generation of social science studies” (p. 3), but to also build a “model for other future studies” (p. 170), important clarifications are needed. As an example, one would expect that the author explains how he combines a bourdieuan inspired “historical political sociology of the legitimate forms of expression” (p. 24), or the onto-epistemological implications of a foucauldian archaeology (pp. 32–34) with the ontological, and mainly epistemological postulates that underpin a quantitative analysis of discourse as developed in the third chapter.

Another possibility would have been to develop a less ambitious, but more rigorous theoretical framework. To take on that same example about Foucault, it is not clear at all why the author decided to include the two pointless pages on the archaeology in the book’s theoretical chapter. Not only are they disconnected from the overall argument, but it is not even sure that they serve the argument. On the contrary,
they contain approximations and strong claims that eventually signal the somehow theoretical frivolity of the overall project. Although the contrast between theoretical superficiality and extreme clarity in the exposition of the argument shows a relative disinterest, if not a complete lack of consideration for theory, it is perfectly consistent with the overall ‘form-based approach’ the author develops.

Such a form-based approach, the author argues, is attentive to “research practices” defined as “the concrete ways of presenting and making an argument in a social science practice” (p. 74) as opposed to deeper discussions about the content. In the author’s view, such discussions on the content play a less crucial role when it comes to questions about ‘scientific validity’, which justifies in return his choice to focus on forms (p. 35). More interestingly, a ‘form-based approach’ would allow us to apprehend knowledge formation and development through legitimised forms of expression that are central elements in the legitimisation of texts, theories, schools and disciplines vis-à-vis one another as well as in the process by which scientific knowledge differentiates from practical knowledge (‘secular’ and ‘regular’ social discourse in the author’s own words, p. 39). Thence, the emphasis on the length and internal structure of IR articles randomly selected by the author among two French (RFSP and Politique étrangère) and two American IR journals (IO and World Politics) to develop his quantitative analysis and eventually ground his argument about the low level of integration of French IR into transnational-American IR – when compared to Scandinavian IR. That said, this methodology does not help understanding why Bertrand Badie (who appears in the book Masters in the Making), Jean-François Bayart (interviewed in the now famous online and interactive forum on IR: Theory Talks) and Didier Bigo (co-founder at the ISA of the IPS section as well as of the journal of the same name), not especially known for writing articles that fit the IMRD format, remain the three most influential French authors in transnational-American IR.

Overall, and as a conclusion, the book International Relations in France. Writing between discipline and state is definitely worth reading, mostly for the original approach the author develops when coupling the historical sociology of the socio-genesis of the state with a political sociology of the legitimate forms of expressions for the study of the formation of a particular domain of knowledge, namely IR in France. It remains unclear nonetheless if the primary question of the author is the relatively weak institutionalisation of IR in France, or the low degree of integration of French IR into transnational-American IR and, if both, how one moves from a set of questions about ‘IR in France’ (as in the title) to ‘French IR’ (in the core of the book). This question the reader is left with suggests that deep discussions about what we call ‘IR’, ‘France’, a ‘discipline’, ‘scientific knowledge’ and a ‘tradition’ in a particular domain of knowledge are probably more important than the author seems to believe.
Izquierdo Brichs, Ferrán (ed.), El islam político en el Mediterráneo. Radiografía de una evolución
(Political Islam in the Mediterranean. Overview of an Evolution)

Reviewed by Ana I. Planet
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid

The year 2011 will go down in history as one in which citizen discontent in the southern Mediterranean countries went beyond occasional episodes of violence and the consequent concessions made by the regimes there. 2011 was a year of permanent claims, multifarious demands and anti-authoritarian protests led by different social groups that resulted in a new political era for some countries. As the editor of this book notes in his preface, in the months following the uprisings, their leaders have had to confront various elites wishing to construct a political system far different from the aspirations expressed in the public spaces and squares.

From the methodological perspective of the sociology of power and with the objective of evaluating the positions and strategies of political Islam in southern Mediterranean countries, the questions that this book answers are articulated around three different aspects of the political systems and their operation. Firstly, it seeks to establish a typology of the actors concerned such as elites and the general population, able to take decisions about whether or not to use the resources of power and whether or not to intervene in power relations. Secondly, it analyses the dynamics that govern these relations, regarded as either linear relations when the population identifies its needs and is mobilised to meet them with a starting and end date or as circular relations when the advantageous positions held by the elites clinging to their positions of power are maintained. Thirdly, it attempts to assess the clout of groups in society (p. 13–15).

In their introduction, Izquierdo Brichs and Etherington propose a study of the development of these political groups, evaluating their participation in the revolution and their current positions. In general, their actions today are qualified as moderate, with this moderation arising from the political stakes that affect all the actors in these systems, who are being forced to act with increasing pragmatism. The search for governability, steering in the direction that the political changes might take, and the need to maintain the status quo of the elites all explain the reasoning, alliances and strategies of each actor, including the groups from political Islam. These evolving positions – much like what Turkey experienced in the previous decade – range in the political sphere from clashes with the regimes to positions of cohabitation. In the ideological sphere, the evolution encompasses everything from positions that deny democracy to ones that consider democracy a mechanism for gaining access to power.
With regard to participation and relations with the regimes, whether authoritarian or undergoing very controlled competitive processes, the best or worst political fate of the groups is presented in contexts where participation is controlled not only for Islamist groups. Each article presents a case analysis of a specific country (Turkey, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Palestine, Israel, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania). For each case, an overview of the situation is presented and analysed, studying the strategies of Islamist actors before and after 2011 and showing the evolution of their positions and ideologies in relation both to the regimes – with a clear evolution towards pragmatism – and to democracy and its values. In general, in a post-2011 context, everyone wishing to gain a position in the system has begun to consider democracy differently from the way they had seen – and confronted – it before, viewing electoral competition as a road to power.

In the solid analysis provided by Brichs and Etherington, this pragmatism shown by Islamist actors is also shared by other elites today to the extent that – as with the liberal reform of the 1990s – allowing Islamists to occupy secondary positions within the political system with limited access to certain spheres of power can be a way of maintaining the system. As the different analyses make clear, the key lies in whether or not the Islamist actors consider their secondary position sufficient and whether they can aspire to a primary position (p. 38–40).

The studies in the text demonstrate that the situation in the early 21st century is assuredly complex. The issue is not one of negotiation or confrontation between regimes and Islamists as it was in the 1990s, but rather negotiation on many fronts. The ‘revolutionary comrades’ do not recognise their allies from the squares and streets in these pragmatic Islamists who have come into power, sharing neither the conservative positions nor the strict moral codes they propose once there (Tunisia and Egypt). Moreover, the Islamists in power cannot afford to allow revolutionary options in the financial domain because the so-called Islamic capital is interested in improving its relationships with the financial elites in the regimes.

Turkey is the subject of the first case study by Durán Cénit and Veiga. The Turkish case acts as an inspiration or precursor for the possibilities of integrating political Islam into a pluralist system. The social bases for Islamist groups since the Second World War are presented in their historical perspective with special emphasis on analysing these bases in the party of the president in government and in other Islamist groups and parties. All form part of a complex network (p. 67–68) in which elements from radicalised political Islam that aspire to become political parties coexist with neo-brotherhoods and more moderate groups hoping to participate in the system.

In the case of Mauritania, analysed by Ojeda Garcia, the various groups – including the Islamists – are finding their space in a slow transitional process (p. 359). In Tunisia, the situation of Islamist groups has changed radically since the revolution, and, indeed, they could be seen as the great beneficiaries of the situation. As Martínez Fuentes (p. 270) explains, the process of political liberalisation since the early months of 2011 has reactivated the mobilising and organisational potential of Tunisian Islamism. For Algeria, overcoming the difficulties of the 1990s continues to be onerous and only the FIS has managed to employ circular power relations to maintain some level of influence in the system, as evidenced by the reform of the 2005 Law of Personal Status (Bustos, p. 313). In the case of Morocco (pp. 319–349), where different groups have emerged in a context of religious pervasiveness in which the monarchy is also an actor, Macías Amoretti analyses how Islamic ethics, which
are common to all, constitute a resource for political power used in different ways by the various groups. In her study of Lebanon, Goenaga Sánchez explains how the complex internal situation and the competition for power since 2005 has resulted in a new sectarian clash that is affecting the strategies and discourses of Sunni and Shiite Islamist groups, both participants in complex coalition games. The country’s sensitivity to events in Syria heralds greater complications in the interior situation.

In their studies of the Muslim Brotherhoods in Syria and Egypt, Álvarez-Ossorio and Ramírez, and Lampridi-Kemou examine the importance of the groups’ prior relationships with the regimes in their post-revolutionary strategy. In the Syrian case, where the regime has fortified itself and intends to exert control by exterminating not only the Muslim Brotherhood but all opposition – triggering a civil conflict – the relationship is a zero-sum game. In Egypt, on the other hand, the relationships between the Brotherhood and the regime and its actors have been so subtle that the group is not seen as radical, but rather as a possible intermediary inside and outside the country. The stability of the region, however, and recent history have raised concerns about how events are developing.

Because of the scarcity of studies done to date on Jamahiriya, the analysis presented by Feliu is particularly noteworthy. The piece attributes its beginning to Islamist groups that “did not form part of the primary or secondary elites as a group at the time,” (p. 237) although some leaders made tentative attempts to participate in the circular power relations, trying to control the ideology or the violence. Political Islam in Libya is, however, clearly influenced by reactions with power and the dismantling of official Islam by the revolutionary regime, resulting in numerous differences in the political and, especially, economic situation in Libya with respect to its neighbours. The narrative about the history of political Islam in Libya, then, is radically different from the other countries, including the strategies for clandestinisation and emergence in the public sphere (p. 248–249). These strategies, along with the use of resources and the nature of political, religious and social discourses with respect to democracy, are all analysed from the perspective of the sociology of power. As with the other countries in the region, the results of future elections and subsequent follow-up will be key to understanding these actors – and evaluating their clout – in the recast political regimes.

For future research, the authors might wish to look more closely at horizontal relations, not only with other Islamic groups in each country, but with the complexity of political actors on the scene at this time, more clearly establishing the resources for which they are competing not only in material terms, but also in terms of the new legitimacy granted them by events as guarantors of democracy or guardians of the revolution.
Françoise Daucé, Une paradoxe opposition, Le pouvoir et les associations enRussie

Reviewed by Aude Merlin
ULB, Brussels

Françoise Daucé’s book, Une paradoxe opposition, Le pouvoir et les associations en Russie (A Paradoxical Opposition, Power and NGOs in Russia), offers a deep insight into the relationship between power and civil society in Russia. This unique work is certainly the most up-to-date and comprehensive study of this topic in French.

Daucé’s work is the result of her detailed research into this topic. She is an experienced researcher in political science, specialising in contemporary Russian studies. She has devoted part of her research to the Russian Army, civil society in Russia and the ideological devices used by the post-Soviet Russian authorities. This book brings together the findings of her long-term research on contemporary Russia.

Daucé sheds light on the relationship between society and power, from the Czarist period to post-Soviet Russia. Her analysis shows how the State, after Vladimir Putin came to the presidency, gradually gained control of a large part of civil society. The study demonstrates that the post-soviet Russian authorities’ policies towards organisations, i.e. civil society, are based upon a very ambiguous strategy. Françoise Daucé shows that their political project, which aims at exerting control over civil society, is carried out using highly paradoxical means. By using techniques and rhetoric which were forged in a liberal and democratic context and, largely, imported into Russia in the 1990s, the Russian authorities – especially after Putin’s accession to the presidency – managed to lay the foundations of a network of organisations under their control. The author analyses this paradoxical method and its results. By officially promoting the creation, the existence and the development of civil society, the authorities manage to increase their control over it. Throughout the work, the author demonstrates how the Russian State, during the 2000’s, has been using legal and financial tools in order to increase its control on the non-profit sector.

The first part deals with the historical legacy of the Czarist and Soviet periods and the challenges of developing civil society during the so-called ‘transition period’. In post-Soviet Russia, NGOs and civil society emerged in a hybrid context: since the concept – and image – of Party/parties was no longer attractive, some political energy was transferred onto NGOs.

Françoise Daucé also points out that the non-profit sector developed in Brezhnev’s time, reminding us that post-Soviet civil society in Russia emerged from experiences dating back to the Soviet period. By drawing an overall picture of the
situation in the late Soviet years, the author notes that the Perestroika period paved the way for the emergence of a civil society.

In the second part of the work, dedicated to how the Russian power is oppressing civil society in a very “civilized manner” (we reproduce here the expression used by the author), Daucé highlights the lessons of the failed experience of the 1990s and addresses the divide between a Western approach and a more culturally-oriented approach to the relationship between society and power. By confronting both approaches, she attempts to explain the failure of democratic endeavours in the 1990s.

The third part focuses on a concrete case study: the author provides an insightful analysis into the construction of the relationship between Russian human rights organisations and Russian power.

This academic work is based on a large range of sources. The author carried out fieldwork throughout the 2000s in Russia and conducted many interviews with civil activists. This material gives a really interesting insight into civil activists’ own perception of their work. In addition to these interviews, the author uses academic sources, reference works about civil society, published interviews, publications from NGOs, as well as broad analyses elaborated upon by Russian intellectuals and international scholars about how Russia has evolved since the USSR collapsed. One of the most interesting points is the way Russian intellectuals assess the techniques used to promote the development of civil society in post-Soviet Russia.

The author provides the reader with a wealth of detailed, precise and well-documented information about the legal framework, existing laws and the constitutional basis, as well as the financial framework – very useful information indeed for scholars interested in Russian politics, and for NGO activists.

Françoise Daucé offers an insightful analysis into how the funding of civil society has had a deep impact on the general picture of civil society in Russia. As a matter of fact, during the 1990s, the approach which was used was largely inspired by the West. Organisations were invited to respond to calls for grants and fulfil requirements adequately. This strategy provided mixed results. It created new kinds of organisations which interacted with private business. At the same time, as the 1990s were marked by a deep social crisis and widespread chaos in many spheres of public life, the idea of democratisation through NGOs and civil society failed and the very concept of democracy became discredited because of large-scale and unbalanced liberalisation.

A cornerstone of this evolution is understandable: by allocating State funding, the Russian power elite felt more comfortable when exerting its control over those sections of civil society whose criticism of the regime was a potential nuisance. The fact that international funding was gradually replaced by Russian State Funds gives a clear view of the evolution, as it was difficult to raise funds from Russian private donors, especially after potential funding from vocal oligarchs became impossible.

In the part of the book dedicated to the “temptation to co-operate”, the author shows the multi-faceted aspect of the relationship and points out that there is not necessarily a strict separation between society and the authorities. On the contrary, there might be fruitful cooperation between human rights defenders and power at a local level, sometimes at the expense of, or in contradiction to, federal authorities.

In conclusion, the author insists that the Russian authorities consciously decided to use a modern tool of management. Civil society appears to be a tool created for the purpose of modernising post-Soviet Russia.
Beyond this well-documented and highly stimulating theory, I wish to point out several aspects which I think should have been made clearer.

The question can be raised: why did the Russian authorities continue to advocate democracy and the necessity of developing civil society and partner organisations throughout the 2000s while praising the ‘power vertical’? This issue may have deserved further development. Why has the rhetoric of democratisation remained prevalent, at least verbally, even as the Russian authorities became increasingly authoritarian throughout the 2000s? Has this rhetoric proved to be more effective for the Russian authorities and given some space to civil society, even if under very strict State supervision and control? The issue of the independence of NGOs versus loyalty is the key point of this analysis.

Another topic could be more developed. In the book, Vladimir Putin is himself personally mentioned, as if he and Russian power were the same. A question can be raised: is he personally the architect of this policy? Or can one more precisely identify the circle of advisers and ideological architects? Finally, who is Russian power when it comes to the policy towards civil society?

Concerning concepts and key-words, the author repeatedly uses general terms such as ‘researchers’, ‘democrats’, ‘traditionalists’, and it seems that such assumptions could be defined more precisely, as it is impossible, from an academic point of view, to encapsulate all researchers, for instance, into a single group. Similarly, the term ‘traditionalists’ – when referring to the debate on the future of NGOs in Russia – could have been defined more precisely. Furthermore, the author often refers to the notion of ‘common sense’ to account for the discrepancy between society and power and the alleged apathy of Russian society. When it comes to these references to ‘common sense’, sources should be cited, all the more so as many academic works have put forward opposite views.

Nevertheless, this work is indeed a tremendous source of information and analysis on this burning issue. One should invite not only scholars and students involved in post-Soviet studies to read this book in order to understand the paradox of the ‘post-Soviet transition’, but also all readers interested in the interaction between power and society in Russia and the role played by civil society in this hybrid post-Soviet Russian regime.

1 A concept introduced by Putin to define the re-centralisation of the presidency’s power and that of the federal state.
Andrea Ellner, Paul Robinson and David Whitlam (eds.), When Soldiers Say No: Selective Conscientious Objection in the Modern Military

Reviewed by Janjira Sombatpoonsiri
Thammasat University, Bangkok

The ‘new’ global war is the ghost that haunts. Despite its complex causes, the latest outbreak of violence by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) fighters epitomises how the US-led Global War on Terror has more or less contributed to opening Pandora’s box of sectarian terror. This is perhaps the final blow to any attempt made to justify the war. This lack of *jus post bellum* (justice after war) reflects the unjust nature of the 2003 Iraqi invasion, supplementing the claims that the decision to go to war (just cause or *jus ad bellum*) and code of conduct in war (*jus in bello*) are unjust. Through explicit and implicit references to this Iraqi war, the edited volume *When Soldiers Say No: Selective Conscientious Objection in the Modern Military* serves as a platform for theoretical debates regarding the ethical and political appropriateness of selective conscientious objection, while sharing experiences of soldiers who refused orders to participate in certain wars they deemed to be unjust.

The book poses three important questions: Is the disobedience of soldiers of their superiors’ command to engage in a war politically and ethically legitimate, given that the war is presumably unjust? What would be the epistemic basis for soldiers’ judgment about the just or unjust nature of a war? And how can diverse experiences of selective conscientious objectors in Western democracies (except for one chapter looking at selective conscientious objection in Israel) bring to light some conceptual and practical tension between moral agency and the military’s discourse of corporate responsibility? Any expectation that this volume will offer definite answers to these questions may not be met fundamentally because the authors of each chapter rely on different analytical lenses in arguing for or against selective conscientious objection. As a result, further debates are encouraged.

The volume comprises fourteen chapters which are organised into three sections: theoretical discussions, case studies and concluding notes. In the theoretical section, a typical proposition supporting the act of conscientious objection is considered. Soldiers possess the right to exercise their moral conscience when contemplating whether the war they are recruited to join is just. In making a case for this position, Emmanuel Goffi, for instance, associates the concept of ‘low cost deontology’ with passive obedience embedded in our organisational military culture. He contends that it is the ‘duty’ of soldiers – in the Kantian sense – to escape from low cost deontology, and think of themselves as autonomous beings. This entry point enables soldiers to assess thoroughly the government’s war justifications, and ways in which the war
is carried out. Possibly, this moral consideration may set the stage for combatants’ refusal to participate in a war.

In a similar vein, Brian Imiola, in his chapter, encourages soldiers to employ their ‘moral diligence,’ instead of attributing the reasons to engage in an unjust war to ‘invincible ignorance,’ that is the total lack of access to knowledge about the unjust basis of this war. Other theoretical chapters tend to refute the tenability of conscientious objection as a moral act on the basis of military integrity and state functionalism. For example, Melissa Bergeron believes in the clear distinction between the justice of war and justice in war. And this forms the social contract in which a government is entitled to protect its citizens from external threats, thereby demanding military service from these citizens. She accordingly argues that individualising the decision whether or not a war is just is likely to sabotage this social contract. Likewise, Michael Skerker challenges the individual-centred approach used to consolidate the case for conscientious objection, by pointing out that it overlooks the corporate culture within the military which prevents the lifting of ‘invincible ignorance.’ He adds that the culture of military obedience is ingrained basically because obedience is vital for the survival of an army as a professional institution.

The second section traces the development of legal, political, ethical experiences of conscientious objectors in Australia, Britain, Canada, Israel and Germany. The degree to which selective conscientious objection is permitted, institutionalised and prohibited vary in these countries. While Australian laws recognise the right of a conscripted individual to be exempted from military service, the British military establishment tends to make its sanction of objectors invisible from the public so as to preclude further desertions. In contrast, due to past war experiences, the German constitution guarantees an individual’s right to refuse military service. In many ways, this implies that the equation of social contract with a citizen’s obligation to defend the state militarily is questionable. The Canadian and Israeli cases are distinct from others because of the contrasting contexts surrounding the issue of conscientious objection, and their implication. In Canada, not only has the conscientious objector status been recognised since the late eighteenth century, but recent judicial decisions attempted at providing sanctuary for selective conscientious objectors of other societies. By comparison, Israel has experienced protracted territorial war. Military conscription is compulsory for both male and female citizens, and selective conscientious objection is virtually outlawed. The author puts forward a radical proposal to abolish the categories of universal and selective objection, contending that allowing certain numbers of conscientious objectors will not undermine Israeli national security.

The last section offers some reflections on practical advantages and disadvantages of implementing a policy of selective conscientious objection within the state and proposes some potential frameworks that might structure state responses. Based on her investigation of the American and British veterans’ experiences in the Iraqi war, Andrea Ellner – one of the volume’s editors – suggests a paradigmatic shift of military ethics that accommodates selective conscientious objectors.

This book is important not only because of its content serving to invite readers to the theoretical and practical debates of conscientious objection, but also due to the professional background of its authors. Many are veterans of wars and current professors in the military academia. Advocators of selective conscientious objection in this volume even used to serve in the wars which they later on deemed unjust.
experience shaped their contribution to an anti-war agenda as well as assistance provided to conscientious objectors. For pacifists and students of civil disobedience, this engagement of military personnel in the continuing debates about ‘refusing an unjust war’ may be an unfamiliar practice. A common assumption is that the army in itself is a violent entity of the state, and its involvement in any war can never be justified. Conscientious objection is typically based on the outright refusal of war’s legitimacy in general. This volume brings to light a more complicated situation wherein individuals’ reasons underpinning their refusal of ‘a’ war are specific and divergent. In addition, the authors’ professional background shows an emerging change in epistemology and practice that can contribute to shifting attitudes regarding the necessity of war as means in politics. As this volume demonstrates, this change stems from within in a bottom-up fashion.

Nevertheless, there are a few conceptual issues that authors in this volume can address further. Firstly, the notion of conscientious objection inevitably carries with it the romantic undertone – the legacy of Enlightenment knowledge which believes in the individual’s moral agency (dubbed conscience), the ability to reason and decide according to their conscience. Recent developments of social sciences, nevertheless, tell us that morality is socially constructed. So is conscience. Politico-cultural settings influence an individual’s ways of seeing things and making decisions. Accordingly, conscience should not be understood only from the moral perspective, but also from the political one. Several authors give some hints that objectors made a decision out of ideological and non-ideological reasons. However, little attempt is made to touch upon the discursive nature of conscience objection, and how it is instrumentalised by different actors involved in a war.

Secondly, various chapters are male-dominated in their tone – albeit there are a few female contributors. For instance, the notion of conscience emerging in the European Enlightenment is gender-biased due to its association with moral will and reason which are discerned, at least among thinkers in that period, to belong to men, rather than women. Similarly, as some authors stress the significance of just war criteria for soldiers’ judgment about their refusal to serve, numerous International Relations feminists may argue that the just war tradition is patriarchal in the ways that it portrays the fixed image of men as protectors and women as victims in the war.¹ This volume could have been more conceptually rigorous had it included a gender-sensitive approach to understanding the issue at stake.

Lastly, professional soldiers and volunteer members are central in the volume’s analyses of selective conscientious objection, while the war contexts and their changing nature which these individuals have undergone are missing (except for Ellner in her conclusion). Far from being conventional, the ‘new’ global war juxtaposes inter-state warfare with local insurgency and ethnic strivings. The Global War on Terror was launched by the coalition of states, fought in certain locations the cultural cosmology of which is alienated from Western allies. This ‘new’ global war is also characterised by technologies of ‘virtual warfare’ (for example remote drone attacks, high-altitude bombing, night vision goggles and even music videos) deployed to create distance between combatants and local insurgents – inducing desensitisation and dehumanisation of the ‘enemy.’² In addition, the war may be justified from the cen-

tre’s perspective, but its legitimacy is highly contested viewed from the periphery where the Western war on terror is discerned as a war on tribal civilisation. The new ‘global’ war tends to be protracted and subject to renewal. Victory is not decisive. This volume could have offered some insights into these changing characteristics of war, and how they influence the discourse and practice of selective conscientious objection.

All in all, this book will be useful primarily for students and researchers of military ethics and peace studies. It is also a good read for policy makers, and war resisters who want to look at the issue of conscientious objection in a different light.


(Global and regional power structures. Global or dual hegemony, multipolarity or co-evolution)

Reviewed by Wolf-Dieter Eberwein
Fonds Croix-Rouge française, Paris

There are interesting books and there are uninteresting books. The former reflect the intellectual capacity of its author to take the reader on a discovery tour, the latter force the reader to move along a path many others before her have explored. And then there is a third kind of book, the one written by Reinhard Hildebrandt. On the one hand it includes some potentially challenging ideas, on the other he leaves the reader guessing what he really wants to demonstrate. Parts of the book read like transcripts from a talk. Before elaborating on these statements, a short summary of the content will precede our evaluation.

The introduction starts with the analogy of the tower of Babel and the inability of people to communicate with one another. The analogy seems to apply to the actual or potential hegemonic Powers in the international system unable to communicate properly with one another and too much preoccupied with the real or imagined threats imputed to the opponent(s). Hildebrandt outlines the different elements of two security systems that failed: the five-Power system constructed at the Congress of Vienna and its modified form after the end of First World War, and the bipolar system that came into being after the Second World War. Today, after the breakdown of the Soviet empire, there is still no consolidated multipolar system including (or excluding) those Powers the author considers as major actors in the global power structure today: the US, China, Russia and India.

In a second step a historical overview of the different power configurations starting with the Pentarchy as a result of the Congress of Vienna is outlined. The reasons why this five-Power configuration was doomed to failure are briefly outlined, this system resting exclusively on a power-based architecture lacking a normative superstructure. The next major structural change was the dual hegemony after 1954 followed by the aim for global hegemony which also failed. At present there seems to be the formation of a concert of globally engaged Powers. In the third part the author analyses the strategy and respectively the changes in strategy by the USA after 1990. For a short time period the belief was that the US was the sole superPower. This part is followed by an attempt to describe and explain the complex Chinese power structure. The localisation of the industrial development of Russia in the global Power structure is the next issue addressed by the author and the difficulties of that country in redefining its role. The uneven relationship between China and India is the final
specific issue addressed before elaborating the potential for the emerging dual hegemony between the USA and China. There are no signs for what Kissinger thought to be a necessity: co-evolution rather than a form of hegemony based on the balance of power determining the new multipolar international order.

In the summary thoughts the author emphasises again his core argument: the difference between a structure based on the notion of hegemony and the uneven power distribution in a multipolar context as opposed to the model of co-evolution that refrains from establishing relations based on power and domination.

What is really interesting about the book? Fundamentally the notion of co-evolution, a concept suggested by Henry Kissinger, seems to be worth elaborating. As the author rightly argues, security policies based on power considerations inevitably lead to a zero sum result, only one side can prevail. The problem therefore is how to avoid such a situation which in the long run is unstable at best, at worst leading to conflict and confrontation. To achieve co-evolution, means that the states are imposing and observing legally based rules determining their economic and financial relations. This means the emergence of a system of norms that will also determine the relations of the states in the existing global and multipolar power structure. The challenge is not so much the idea that (economic) interdependence is conducive to peace but rather how exactly such a process of co-evolution can be implemented. The author makes a reference to this process of change from the action-reaction mechanism to that of movement-countermovement. But it remains unclear what that means both in structural as well as behavioural terms.

And here the author himself seems to be at loss if such changes can be envisaged at all. A major argument is that the US has not really given up the notion of hegemony. And the reference to the security conference in Munich in 2013 shows that the US vice president Biden has no answer when it comes to the question how to reframe if not abandon the global policeman role of his country.

Does the historical overview really answer or put more modestly, get closer to an answer of how to overcome the hegemonic solution in international politics? The answer is negative. A first shortcoming is the underdevelopment of the theoretical foundations of the book. The author speaks of the theory of realism which indicates either a deliberate choice for simplification or a lack of knowledge. The same is true when he argues about the theory of global governance. What is more irritating is the fact that he does not develop at all the link between domestic politics and foreign policy. This is a problem. He argues that the relations between potential hegemons have to be disaggregated into a set of dyadic relations. And this implies that the individual foreign policies depend to varying degrees on domestic politics and these may vary depending on the particular targets. The Tea Party radicalism in the United States clearly imposes limits on the Obama administration’s international strategy. His argument that Putin has become much more reconciliatory has been refuted recently with Putin’s strategy of destabilisation of the Ukraine.

In the end this book is in the best tradition of policy experts analysing the flow of daily events but not refraining from drawing major conclusions or generalisations which may turn out to be utterly wrong months or years later. It lacks the systematic foundation of a theoretical framework that implies a certain modesty of what we think we know with certainty about reality. In other words, the book is a good example of how an author minimises his strengths because of a lack of rigour.

Reviewed by Marieke Louis
CERI-Sciences Po

Currently Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Relations (IR) at the University of Catania in Italy, Daniela Irrera is also an ‘IR practitioner’. Since 2005, she has been involved in the Saint Joan’s International Alliance, a ‘Catholic feminist’ non-governmental organisation (NGO) founded in 1911, through which she has experienced the UN system from the inside.

This background – to which the author herself refers at the beginning of the book – is far from anecdotal. Indeed, her contribution is an attempt to demonstrate academically the added-value of NGOs within the framework of intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) in the field of humanitarian action, through a comparison of NGOs’ activities at the UN and EU levels. Relying on both secondary and primary sources, namely interviews conducted in Geneva and Brussels with 28 humanitarian NGOs between 2009 and 2011, the author argues that the relationship between NGOs and IGOs is not only based on the instrumentalisation of the former by the latter but is really one of interdependence and complementarity. According to the author: “NGOs have an impact on the transformation of the structure and processes of world politics. The participation in humanitarian intervention and peace operations represents a policy area in which such a set of processes may be operationalised and tested. […] NGOs can be analysed as members of the ‘humanitarian system’” (p. 2).

Contrary to this traditional ‘top-down’ approach, the author suggests a more complex and dynamic relationship in which NGOs have become real security ‘actors’, and are considered more and more by IGOs as decisive assets in the humanitarian field. Not only do they play a variety of roles (knowledge providers, peace facilitators, voice-articulators) (p.133), but they sometimes also fill the gaps of intergovernmental action on the ground, hence generating processes of “hybridisation”, whereby the frontier between IGO and NGO becomes increasingly blurred. The author explores four questions: is there a preferred model of dialogue with IGOs? How and why do NGOs sometimes coordinate with IGOs even though they are primarily independent actors? How do NGOs try to influence decisions in the field of crisis management and humanitarian intervention? What roles are they expected to play in parallel or alongside intergovernmental actors? (p. 3).

1 According to the NGO itself: http://stjoansinternationalalliance.org/about-us/
2 Although the author herself does not use the expression.
The book is divided into six chapters, each presenting a quite coherent, even independent structure. We shall therefore introduce each chapter before entering into a more general discussion of the author’s thesis and demonstration.

The first chapter, which is a mainly theoretical one, comes back to the literature on the role of civil society and NGOs at the international level. It aims at providing a ‘middle way’ between the romanticised vision of civil society as idealistic actors and the realist-sceptical vision which tends to underestimate the role that non-state actors in general can play in the field of global politics. Whereas civil society, understood as an independent collective entity distinct from both state and market, embraces a great variety of organisations, the author’s choice to focus on ‘NGOs’ derives from the premise that both the UN and the EU have manifested a preference for dialogue with organisations that have “a rigid structure, a clear overview of aims and principles, and, as consequence, a strong problem-solving approach, that is, NGOs” (p. 13). While the author criticised the narrowness of the dominant realist paradigm, she does not really manifest her preference for one paradigm over the other but rather explores the different approaches (transnational, pluralist, institutionalist, functionalist) that have paid attention to NGOs as significant actors of world politics in the last two decades.

Chapter 2 depicts the patterns of dialogue that the UN and the EU have set up vis-à-vis NGOs in the second half of the twentieth century and the decisive role played by the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) on the one hand, and the European Commission and the Parliament on the other in institutionalising dialogue with NGOs. One of the main differences between the two systems is the degree of institutionalisation: whereas the UN has developed a set of rules and procedures in order to grant NGOs a consultative status over the years (in the framework of Article 71 of the UN Charter), the EU system appears much more flexible, though less open and transparent. Whereas the EU, like the UN, has explicitly and constantly dialogue with NGOs, it has clearly privileged dialogue with economic group interests (namely trade unions and employers organisations) over human rights and humanitarian organisations. However, within both systems, the author identifies a constant tension between formal and informal procedures in order for NGOs to gain recognition from these institutions: while the UN has begun to open more spaces for a less formal dialogue with NGOs at the highest level in the 1990s (the UN Security Council), the EU has clarified its procedures of cooperation towards NGOs over the last ten years.

Chapter 3 then explores the roles that NGOs play in the field of humanitarian action in a general and socio-historical perspective. Whereas humanitarian NGOs have existed since the nineteenth century, the author shows how the end of the Cold War has created a window of opportunity for an increased cooperation between NGOs and IGOs within the ‘humanitarian system’ which gathers a large set of actors (UN agencies, regional organisations, governments, international Red Cross actors, international NGOs and local NGOs and civil society actors) and activities (conflict management, conflict resolution, conflict transformation and mediation) in which NGOs (both international and local) have supplemented the action of IGOs. However, the author shows that working with IGOs is far from self-evident for NGOs that have put the values of independence and neutrality at the core of their mandate. She therefore suggests to distinguish NGOs according to the following types (p. 67): the pragmatist Wilsonian NGOs that are likely to work in parallel with IGOs’ interven-
tions; the principle-centred Dunantist NGOs whose participation in intervention is subordinated to the respect of the basic principles of humanitarianism; the solidarist NGOs that are focused on solving the root causes of conflict, and the faith-based NGOs whose participation is subordinated to the values of charity and compassion.

The next two chapters then portray the role of humanitarian NGOs within the UN (chapter 4) and EU (chapter 5) institutions. With regard to the UN, the author argues that NGOs have proved to be decisive in the diffusion of human rights ideas within UN humanitarian action (such as the R2P principle) but also in requiring that greater attention be put on civil-military relations. Whereas UN institutions have acknowledged the added-value of NGOs, the main challenge that this cooperation faces today is clearly one of coordination. As regards the role of NGOs in the field of EU institutions, the author witnesses the same trend of growing implication of NGOs in the humanitarian field, especially within the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) established in 1992 to handle the EU’s development of relief operations. In 2012 50% of the organisations funded by ECHO were NGOs, 39% UN organisations and 11% other international organisations. Moreover, the EU separation between military and civilian activities has opened a window of opportunity for NGOs’ integration. However, if coordination is a salient issue at the UN level, there is still no strategic approach towards NGOs on the part of the EU but only occasional cooperation.

Having this broad perspective in mind, the last chapter is dedicated to the author’s own survey of IGOs/NGOs relationships mainly based on interviews with NGOs’ representatives chosen according to two criteria: the existence of an official relationship with the UN or the EU, and the registration of their activity under the label ‘humanitarian’. In order to measure the impact of NGOs, the author, consistent with the existing literature on the topic, explores three main dimensions: the interactions with IGOs, the relationships with the military on the ground, and the variety of activities they perform during the different phases of the crisis. One of the key features the author highlights is the diversity of tasks performed by ‘humanitarian’ NGOs, which operate mostly in Africa and Asia: of the 28 organisations that use the label ‘humanitarian’, only 16 identify themselves as such, the others preferring the terms ‘development’ and ‘peacebuilding’. Another striking feature is the diversity of donors (governments, private foundations, EU and UN institutions) and the network structure under which most of them operate. While the literature stresses the problematic aspect of funding in terms of IGOs independence, the survey shows that NGOs have much more leverage on the use of resources than might be expected.

Regarding the key features selected to test the impact of NGOs, while a vast majority acknowledges being regularly consulted by IGOs in the field of humanitarian action, a third of them asserts that they have not been consulted at all. The results of the survey show that, on average, NGOs are less consulted by IGOs on humanitarian matters than on other general issues. As regards the relationships with the military, the findings are consistent with the literature that underlines the recurrent tensions between the two. However, whereas there is no coordination of activities, cooperation is also, from time to time, inevitable. Indeed, looking at the tasks performed by NGOs, the author suggests that NGOs’ roles in peace operations can be best described through the following typology: during the pre-crisis phase, NGOs play a role of knowledge providers, that is to say that NGOs’ members are mostly experts and can be used to inform not only IGOs but also the military; then during
the crisis and immediate post-crisis phases, they are mostly peace facilitators intervening in the field of relief, assistance and mediation; in the post crisis phase, NGOs are described as voice-articulators, in charge of taking initiatives to rebuild society. Moreover, although the dialogue with the UN is more institutionalised, there is no real difference between the two models of dialogue, neither in terms of consultation nor in terms of outcomes (p. 121).

To conclude with a more critical assessment of this work, whereas the book provides a conceptually and empirically rich overview on the issue of cooperation between IGOs and NGOs, one might regret that the empirical survey has not been given more space and somehow remains at the margins of the study. The author clearly makes her point in asserting that NGOs are to be considered as an integral part of the humanitarian system, but it would have been interesting to reinstate the survey at the core of the argument, namely by insisting more on the added-value of comparing the UN and EU systems of dialogue. Moreover, the focus on the organisational level tends to conceal the role that individuals may have played in the institutionalisation of dialogue and cooperation between IGOs and NGOs in the field of humanitarian intervention - by having, for instance, a prior professional involvement in one of these two spheres. However, those questions do not undermine the conceptual and empirical value of this research that is both informative for researchers and practitioners and accessible for IR students.
Markus-Michael Müller, Public Security in the Negotiated State: Policing in Latin America and Beyond

Reviewed by John Bailey
Georgetown University

The subtitle notwithstanding, this excellent book is about the role of policing in state formation processes in Mexico, and – more precisely – Mexico City, although the author casts sidelong glances at Latin America more generally and at other world regions in the concluding chapter. The theory ‘lens’ focuses on processes of state-making, adopting a ‘state-in-society’ approach associated with Joel Migdal. This approach avoids a ‘deficit list’ perspective, viewing the state in most of the world on its own terms rather than contrasting it with an idealised European version. The formal police play a central role in state-making as officers interact and negotiate with individuals and groups from various strata of civil society to establish and maintain order. The central argument is straightforward and interesting.

[T]he study argues that policing in Mexico is highly fragmented and selective, overdetermined by informal politics and practices of negotiation. These practices of negotiation enable a wide variety of actors to appropriate the police for private purposes, depending upon available social, political and economic capital. This reflects the underlying characteristics of a particular type of state, which, due to the centrality of informal political negotiations, I will call negotiated state (p. 4, emphasis in the original).

Müller does a good job of reviewing relevant literature on the state in order to locate his particular approach, which emphasises policing and the “fabrication of social order” (p. 17) by viewing the police as functioning within the realm of politics and power relations. He organises the presentation around three levels. The macro-level provides a summary overview of state-formation processes in Mexico from the early 19th Century through to the democratic transition of the late 20th Century. The meso-level examines policing in Mexico City, mostly in the period after 1997 under mayors from the centre-left Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). The micro-level compares and contrasts the Mexico City neighbourhoods (delegaciones) of Coyoacán (middle and upper economic strata) and Iztapalapa (mostly working class). The conclusion assesses the relevance of the negotiated-state approach for other parts of Latin America and the developing world. The method is ethnographic: “The book is based on 127 qualitative interviews with academics, journalists, NGO members, members of the local administration of justice, politicians, bureaucrats, local entrepreneurs and local residents conducted between 2005 and 2009 in Mexico City” (p. 25). The presentation is clear and accessible, even with respect to complicated conceptual and theoretical matters.
What sets this book apart in the growing literature on policing in Latin America is the conceptual richness that guides and informs empirical descriptions. A central process in state formation is the “politics of appropriation,” a term that describes the “ever present possibility of appropriating state resources, including the police, for private (coercive, political and economic) purposes, as an important element in the strategy of rule” (p. 30). In essence state agents can expand the reach of their rule by allowing private interests to share in or even co-opt state powers. This process permits a mediated form of political governability for state elites, who lack the institutional capacity to rule through force or consensus. In effect, state rulers “decide to convert the state into a resource to be appropriated by local strongmen in order to create a state space as a space of appropriation as well as to enhance the ‘reach of the state’” (p. 37). This sort of power-sharing creates formal institutions that may be stable, “but whose rules remain unenforced, or better, selectively enforced” (p. 40). State agents can manipulate formal rules to maintain or transform the informal rules that undergird the exercise of state power.

“Security clientelism” is one of many processes in the politics of appropriation in state-making. It refers to “an instrumental relationship in which a person of higher (political, economic, social) status uses his personal influence and resources for the provision of protection and security for a person (or persons) of lower (political, economic, social) status. The latter depend(s) on this personalized delivery of protection-related resources and is (are) therefore willing to offer support to the patron” (p. 108). Thus, security is not a public good provided to all citizens as a legal right. Rather, it is a quasi-public good that is provided to clients in exchange for political support or favours or for material goods, especially money. The allocation of security is negotiated informally by police-justice agents, who in turn depend on political patrons for career advancement. Negotiations between state agents and civil society can vary along socioeconomic lines, as the author brings out in his comparisons at the neighbourhood level. Middle class residents of Coyacán use status and connections in their negotiation of personal and group security, while working class residents in Iztapalapa rely more on material resources as well as on votes and selective mobilisation.

Müller uses path dependency and critical junctures to analyse dynamics of change brought on by the democratic transition beginning in the 1980s. Democratization and decentralisation tended to reinforce the negotiating position of civil society with respect to security clientelism, even as criminal violence has increased. He also links the Mexico case to external dynamics, showing – for example – how fashionable ‘best practices’ in policing, such as zero-tolerance or community policing can be manipulated by political elites as symbolic politics to portray themselves as modern administrators. A lesson is that outside policy advisors need to view the Mexican state on its own terms and understand that the politics of appropriation drives security policy. Community policing, for example, typically reinforces clientelism by creating neighbourhood citizen advisory committees as arenas in which specific interests can lobby for personal or group agendas.

Based on findings from middle-class Coyocán the author also introduces the intriguing notion of “horizon of legitimacy,” which “ascribes the state with extraordinary symbolic power, normative expectations, and symbolic appeal” (p. 175). Müller agrees with Monique Nuijten that despite the inability of the Mexican state to deliver on its own promises it does not fail but rather turns into a highly stable ‘hope-
The state becomes a ‘magical state,’ a site for the performance of illusion where the performing actors fall under the spell of their own performances, making the state incarnate in a compelling way for all the actors involved. This line of reasoning, evidently limited to the middle class, opens up new possibilities for envisioning some aspects of state-society relations.

The book’s state-in-society perspective on policing makes this a significant contribution. Similar to Vanda Felbab-Brown’s notion of ‘competitive state-making’ among governments, insurgents, and criminal organisations, it draws our attention to the continuing struggle between legal-ethical coalitions and corrupt-criminal coalitions within states and societies to shape how democratic governance evolves over time. The book’s core strengths are the theoretical discussions and empirical analyses of Mexico City. The theoretical approach travels well, but ethnographic studies by their nature tend to be subjective, and one wonders what a different analyst might interpret from a similar set of interviews. Ethnographic case studies are also place-specific, and we cannot generalise much to other cities within Mexico, much less to other countries. As the author points out, Mexico City is a ‘sanctuary city’ with a comparatively dense presence of the state and a high ratio of police to population. The brutal confrontations between criminal organisations, police, and armed forces in cities like Matamoros and Cuidad Juárez and in regions of Michoacán and Guerrero would paint much cruder pictures of the politics of appropriation.

Further, Müller’s assertion that the ‘negotiated state’ is a particular type of state invites a reflection on continua and categories. He does not depict a ‘non-negotiated state,’ one in which state authorities rule without regard to societal context. This might be the case at particular time junctures of extreme authoritarianism (for example Stalinism in the USSR of the 1930s or North Korea at the turn of the century). Apart from a few extreme cases, however, we have a broad array of pluralist systems in which the police negotiate with civil society about order maintenance on a continuing basis. The negotiated state would seem to range from metropolitan regions in presumably ‘developed’ countries, such as Italy, to ‘developing’ countries like Nigeria. Some subtypes could help us bring order to such a vast universe.

A relevant exercise on continua and categories is Juan Linz’s insightful discussion of pluralism-authoritarianism-totalitarianism, in which he uses variables of elite consensus, ideology, pluralism, and mobilisation. These can be arrayed along a continuum from liberal pluralist to totalitarianism, but Linz makes a plausible argument for thresholds and categories in order to identify authoritarianism as a distinctive regime type, to be differentiated from liberal-pluralist and totalitarian. It is beyond the scope of this review, but relevant variables for a typology of the negotiated state might include the institutional coherence and capacity of the state’s police-justice system, the citizenry’s evaluations of the state and regime and its main institutions, along with the voluntary disposition of civil society to comply with the state’s laws.

That noted, Müller’s book succeeds in showing how the state-in-society approach and related concepts can be applied to illuminate the role of policing in the continuing processes of state-making. This is especially welcome for the study of a region whose top-priority issue is citizen (in)security, due mostly to criminality. The interesting focus here is not technical issues of policing but the ways in which policing shapes the evolution of the democratic state.

Reprints from Volume 23 number 2 Oxford Studies in Comparative Education (ISSN 0961-2149)

Reviewed by Anne Corbett
London School of Economics and Political Science

The way in which globalisation has impacted on the internationalisation of higher education and academic mobility has been a significant theme in the academic literature of higher education for more than a decade. Pioneers in this area, and notably Simon Marginson who contributes the foreword to this book, have long been writing about the unstoppable processes of globalisation moving us towards a single world society, and the tensions that creates between global pluralisation and standardisation. Their evidence lies in the hegemony of English-language science, the persistent strength of the US model of research universities, the growing development of performance indicators in education, carried out on behalf of the developed economies by OECD; the emergence of global rankings of universities; the recent irruption of massive open online courses (MOOCs) promoted by world class universities; and the growing evidence of the shift in global power with the rise of the East Asian economies. Six alone invest as much in R&D as Europe (p. 9). Meanwhile international mobility increases exponentially. It was estimated to be under 250,000 in 1960; 3.3mn in 2008 and perhaps 7.8mn by 2025.

Recent literature has contributed to a certain disentangling of how globalisation is best understood. The trend has been to separate the ideological interpretations, notably how the linkage between globalisation and neoliberalism has featured (Olsen and Peters 2006) from the rather sparser empirical evidence of globalisation. Rizvi and Lingard (2010) have done important work here, while adding a third take. Their concern is constructions of meaning through globalisation, notably what they term a social imaginary meaning. A recent addition to the literature has suggested fruitful new conceptualisations in linking education, sociology and geography to underpin the study of student mobility and the internationalisation of higher education (Brooks and Waters 2011).

This book is making its pitch in a crowded field. It does so on the basis of a collection of empirical studies, addressed to a higher education studies audience. Its aim is to inject some fresh ideas into the comparative literature of higher education. It is structured in three parts and comprises 17 chapters.
The first part of the book is scene setting, treating the global issues of internationalisation and mobility in terms of five issues. There is first the shifting balance between the traditional players (US, UK, Anglophone countries) and new actors, and the challenge of new modes such as online MOOCS for traditional institution-based structures highlighted by Rahul Choudaha and Hans de Wit. They focus on the potential change to be expected since September 11, 2001 and the financial crash of 2008 in terms of global competition for top talent, the diversity of mobile students, language and levels of study, all phenomena with the potential to alter the existing order. But given such factors as the continued growth of demand by internationally mobile students, and the ageing populations of Europe needing the dynamic of new ideas, they conclude that the growth of international student mobility is not coming to an end yet.

This scene setting view of trends needs to be combined with shifting understandings of what the internationalisation of higher education means. Here Jane Knight, who has been developing definitions and taxonomies of internationalisation for years, sees developments in terms of three generations of interpretation. There was a long phase that older hands will treasure when internationalisation meant collaborative scholarship. However, with a strong incentive to develop profits, by 2000 the critical mass in internationalisation had shifted to programmes and providers. There is, she argue, now a third generation of internationalisation dynamics, characterised by the growth of global educational hubs. However her conclusion that we have moved on from brain drain to brain gain and brain train is not substantiated here.

The other chapters in this first part highlight some alternative strategies of internationalisation: the case for paying attention to the Millennium Goals, the pedagogical benefits of North-South collaboration, and what a major fellowship programme (that of the Ford Foundation) can teach us.

The core of the book lies in the second section on mobility in different regions. These chapters feature not only Europe, the US, and China, but also the more rarely treated Islamic world, Ethiopia, and Cuba. The third part profiles the role of individual institutions, practitioners and participants in shaping international education in everyday practice. It features intercultural learning in US education abroad, Erasmus students’ conception of citizenship, based on the programme in Germany; the impact, or lack of impact on incoming students and what professionals see as the key features.

This book is implicitly making a critique of an OECD view of the world by trying to enlarge the reader’s vision rather than by tackling directly the phenomena noted by Marginson. The chapters in general add up to a possible challenge to received readings of international trends, national and regional practice and the role of individuals. But reader be alert: you make your own way. The editor has not chosen to write a critical introduction to the book, nor to offer conceptual themes related to internationalisation, beyond

‘the massification of higher education, increased information sharing; expanded means of travel; greater movement of students and professionals world wide through an ever-changing matrix of sending and receiving countries and the shifting push and pull factors which drive them; challenges to traditional public education through new private niche providers; rapidly developing MOOCs and other experiments, and an ongoing race for new partnerships and learning collaborations through any variety of cross-border configurations’ (p. 11).
Nor is there an index which might have aided a reader’s construction of themes.

However this reviewer has gained some insights, and they come chiefly from selected chapters in part two. These are Bernd Wächtter’s chapter on recent trends in student mobility in Europe; Jürgen Henze on Chinese perspectives on internationalisation; Rose C. Amazan on Ethiopia, Anne Hickling-Hudson and Robert F. Arnow on higher education and international student mobility as managed by Cuba, Anthony Welch on Islamic Higher Education, and Thomas Nørgaard on the supposed original philosophy of the Erasmus programme.

Collectively these chapters suggest that we might, with more evidence, be able to build some new generalisations which would revise some of the received ideas about internationalisation. The first is that Europe has no cause for complacency even if it is still the destination of 50 per cent of international students, for Europe is failing to look outwards. The second is that the current leaders in internationalisation (and, I would add the countries on the European periphery) may be failing to perceive the potential of diasporas to influence the quality of higher education policymaking. Thirdly, as the concept of mobility and internationalisation undergoes the changes that Knight points to, we should also be widening our concept of higher education hubs.

Wächtter’s chapter deserves wide circulation. It is an account of how the meaning of international students has been changed largely under pressure from the Academic Cooperation Association which he has run for many years. It is only now that the inflationary effect of counting foreign-born students already resident in their country of study is being excluded. He has a fine analysis of both incomers and outgoers. But for the purposes of this review the chapter is also notable for the almost throw-away line about the low rates of outward mobility of European students: ‘One would think that Europe needs a critical mass of young, highly educated future leaders with first-hand experience in [the] economic powerhouses of tomorrow’ (p. 94).

The contrast with the Chinese is instructive. Henze introduces us to the role of the Chinese ‘knowledge diaspora’ and the ‘academic intellectual diaspora’ born of the combination of Chinese language and cultural original, in combination with a first academic degree from a Chinese institution and a PhD at a Western university. These young researchers are integral to the creation of a new academic space beyond disciplinary, cultural and national boundaries and to identity formation (p. 188). Far greater critical understanding of what Chinese policy is aimed at is becoming possible, as are the possibilities of richer academic collaboration.

The chapter on Ethiopia is a sad story of losing the good will of a well-intentioned diaspora of skilled professionals the country desperately needs when you cannot offer them the resources to make a difference. It holds the unenviable position of African leader in terms of losing the well qualified to an easier existence abroad. The chapter on Cuba is enlightening. By basing its internationalisation policy on solidarity with other developing countries, provision based on need and capability, it has attracted many students from the global south. It is an example which merits further study.

The book also produces welcome evidence of the policy diversity of Islamic states. It is sad however to be told by Welch that a famous saying attributed to Mohammed is probably apocryphal: ‘Seek knowledge throughout the World, even if you have to go to China’ (p. 136). But Welch’s chapter is a reminder of the way in which Baghdad, Cairo and Alexandria were once extraordinary centres of scholar-
ship long before becoming sites of war, and his is an effective introduction to the
diverse ways in which countries of South East Asia now treat knowledge. His com-
parison of Indonesia and Malaysia is instructive. Despite its population ten times the
size of Malaysia’s, Indonesia has not developed policies to attract tertiary students
from elsewhere to its universities and many of its students travel to Malaysia. Ma-
laysia in contrast has situated itself as an outward looking ‘eduhub’ with an ambi-
tious programme to get national institutions featured in international rankings while
extending its influence regionally and trans-regionally. Among the features, it offers
programmes in English and in Arabic, and plays an active role in pan-Islamic bod-
ies. It has been a keen participant in the development of an Islamic Higher Education
Area, modelled loosely on the European Higher Education Area.

The last chapter on which I wish to comment is the sparkling essay by Nørgaard
on Sofia Corradi, an educationist who played a leading role in the 1980s in develop-
ing the ideas on which the Erasmus programme was initially based. She started on
this path as an indignant Fulbright student who came back with a master’s degree
from Columbia to find the Italian system was snubbing her for doing it. The experi-
ence launched her on a two decades’ fight in support of student mobility based on the
liberal education she had enjoyed in the US. Nørgaard goes on to contrast the rich
liberal arts ideas behind Erasmus with the bureaucracy of the Bologna process. The
evolution of European policymaking in higher education has been at the centre of my
own researches, I have met many of the early actors as well as having searched the
archives, and I cannot agree with the black and white picture he paints (see Corbett

Let me end by saying that I know that it is tough producing a book whether ed-
ited or a monograph. I do not want to criticise unduly. But by the time I had finished
this book I wished that the prolific publisher behind it had been thinking a bit more
about the busy world academics live in, and what makes a book a book. To bring 17
chapters previously published in a review without saying why we might want to read
them as a book will leave many potential readers by the wayside. At best this book
is as a taster for readers wanting to know more about the topic. And as I have tried to
indicate here, it does offer a few sparks for future scholarship. But there was clearly
a better book struggling to get out, had those connected with its production accorded
it more time and thought.


Reviewed by Lindsay Black  
Leiden University Institute of Area Studies (LIAS)

In *China, the European Union and Global Governance* Wouters, de Wilde, Defraigne, and Defraigne have assembled an eclectic mix of academics, think tank specialists, and policymakers to reflect upon China-EU relations within the global order. Their edited volume is the result of an international conference ‘China, the EU and the Restructuring of Global Governance’ held in Brussels in May 2010 and covers four issue areas in China-EU relations, namely: the World Trading System, The World Financial and Monetary System, Climate Change and Energy, and Security and Politics. Following an introduction that provides an overview of the 20 chapters, the first part of the book examines recent shifts in the global order to set the tone for the subsequent sections. This review provides a critical assessment of each of the book’s five parts, before concluding with a general appraisal of the edited volume as a whole.

The first three chapters by Defraigne, Wang, and Fleming respectively consider what the recent shifts in the global order mean for EU-China relations and global governance. After setting out a brief historical overview of China’s rise from the 1800s on, Jean-Christophe Defraigne argues that China’s rise may be less destabilising than the emergence of Germany as a great Power in the late 19th Century, both because of obstacles to China’s continued economic development and the interdependence of economies in a globalised world. Despite the importance of the EU as an actor, Defraigne perceives the EU as playing a peripheral role in determining the nature and impact of China’s rise. In chapter two, Wang Yiwei approaches the shifts in the global order from a different angle, arguing that China-EU relations have never been better and that the relationship is based on strong commonalities, such as history, culture, and encapsulating diverse identities within a single framework of governance, and sharing common values, such as effective multilateralism and global governance. Though there are no doubt commonalities, Wang’s claim that the EU and China “are possibly the only two consistent and ancient civilizations with dynamic identities in the world” is not convincing. Despite the commonalities that Wang highlights, he also stresses that the EU should avoid forcing China to abide by the EU’s approach to contemporary issues, including climate change. The third

---

chapter by Fleming provides a history of the G7 and G20 and asserts that the G20 is more of a talk shop and therefore unlikely to become a major forum for global governance. Instead the G7 will remain a central actor in global politics.

Taken together these three chapters set out diverse possibilities for shifts in the global order leaving it open for later chapters to determine where they stand in relation to this opening section. Whilst this gives the contributors a great deal of freedom, one does not get a sense of what the shifts in the global order really are, what they mean, or how one might frame changes to global governance. This freedom also means that throughout the volume contradictory perspectives arise concerning similar issues. This would not be so problematic if these differences were openly debated, but despite covering similar topics, the chapters tend not to refer to each other.

Part two tackles China-EU relations in terms of the world trading system. The opening chapter by Wouters and Burnay outlines the challenges facing the World Trade Organisation (WTO) that both the EU and China need to address in the interests of global governance. They argue that misperceptions and disagreements between the EU and China undermine the possibilities for effective cooperation. Chapter 5 by Wang Xiaodong notes that the EU has played a leadership role in the Doha round of trade talks and China has proactively engaged in the WTO. For the Doha round to be successful, however, Wang stresses that dialogue is essential. In chapter 6, Wu compares the EU’s and China’s regulatory frameworks on African development policy, maintaining that between EU conditionality and Chinese non-interference a middle way is possible. This section would have benefited from a consideration of how differences in the WTO and in terms of development policy could be tackled by both sides.

In part three, authors address China and EU positions in relation to the world financial and monetary system. Pierre Defraigne argues in favour of a monetary G3, comprising the EU, US, and China and that these Powers should collectively guide both the G20 and IMF and advance more far reaching financial regulations. This trilateral cooperation is required because the responses to the global credit crunch have resulted in excessive liquidity that threatens the long term health of the global economy. In addition Defraigne’s G3 need to reform current account balances structurally, especially between the US and China. Similarly, in chapter 8, Aglietta argues in favour of adjusting the economic policies of US and China, stating that revaluing the Chinese currency (RMB) is only one aspect of this complex bilateral relationship. Aglietta proposes a bold reform of the IMF that goes beyond just amending voting rights. He also calls for an Asian Currency Unit in East Asia, though there has been little appetite for this in the region following the Eurozone crisis, and regional leadership in East Asia remains contested by Japan and China. Plasschaert also stresses that we need to look beyond the issue of RMB being undervalued or not as China’s place in the global economy is far more complex. His chapter looks at the phenomenal growth of China’s economy and reveals a number of caveats that enable a reevaluation of China’s economic power, including the role of foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) and Hong Kong. In chapter 10, Bo outlines China’s engagement with international monetary institutions, arguing that China will only accept international norms that are compatible with its domestic reform agenda. He asserts that this reform agenda has been mostly improvised and incremental and that as a result China is still learning how to operate in global financial institutions. Here again, differences in approach and in terms of national interests belie how cooperation might
proceed. In addition, can the reform of the international financial system be entrusted to the very governments whose deregulation of that system brought it near collapse in 2008? Which other actors deserve a voice in this process of reform?

Part four brings together six chapters on climate change and energy. In an introduction to the section, Belis and Schunz outline some of the key challenges concerning global climate change and energy. They note that whilst both China and the EU are central to the resolution of environmental issues and that both sides are starting to realise this, neither side has identified substantial common ground for cooperation. In chapter 12, Cooper urges that practical solutions to practical problems be found and proposes a harmonised charge on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and that the EU should supply China with carbon capture technology as examples. Such practical solutions have to lead to an all-encompassing and coordinated approach to climate change. In chapter 13, Chen focuses on climate change and technology transfer and low-carbon economy development in China. He urges a greater emphasis on technology transfer and notes that cutting emissions undermines economic development and employment, both core goals for the Chinese government. The next chapter, by Chang, Belis, and Bruyninckx, examines the regulations and key domestic actors involved in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and renewable energy in China. Focusing on wind projects, they argue that the CDM is a key part of the puzzle regarding technology transfers, but that there is a disconnection between a Chinese government that urges more technology transfers and EU companies focused on market share. Ultimately, they conclude that the CDM does not currently benefit the EU. In chapter 15, Snoy outlines challenges facing the restructuring of global governance on energy, particularly in light of China’s growing energy needs, and stresses the need to move to a low carbon energy system, but “without undermining economic and social development”.

Considering Chen’s concerns in chapter 13 about economic development and employment, it is not clear how Snoy envisages this move. However, he emphasises that the ‘EU-China dialogue on Energy and Transport Strategies’ provides a framework for cooperation. In the final chapter in this section, Buijs and Geuns also concentrate on the wind sector and set out the opportunities and constraints, including the issue of technology transfer, that European firms face when operating in China. In addition, they agree with Snoy that Chinese energy consumption is the key issue, but do not consider the point raised in chapter 14, that the EU has exported most of its energy intensive industries, including to China. Though many of the chapters in this fourth section raise technology transfer as a key issue regarding EU-China relations on climate change and energy, there is no attempt to compare and contrast the different positions put forward.

The final section addresses a broad array of security and political issues. In chapter 17, Atanassova-Cornelis looks at the US-Japan alliance and the rise of China. She argues that bilateral alliances and power balancing are the predominant features of East Asia’s security order, but that there may be a role for the EU in terms of promoting regional institutionalism based on its experience. This is a fair point, but one that has already met with some resistance amongst East and Southeast Asian participants within the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM). The next chapter by de Wilde d’Estmael focuses on the EU arms embargo to China that was put in place after the Tiananmen incident. He offers an interesting critical lens in terms of Chinese perceptions of EU
neoimperialism, hedonism, consumerism, and double standards that contrast with the notion of the EU as a model of regional integration for others to follow. His contentions that “[C]hina is not yet an actor on the world stage, [as] it is unable to make or even influence substantially the rules of the game in the international arena” and that the “EU and China are comparable powers” both require elaboration particularly in light of Wouters and Burnay’s claim that the EU is weaker than China in shaping the global order.

Chapter 19 by Cuyckens explores whether the EU and China are capable of challenging the US and shaping a new world order. She asserts that though China and the EU are becoming more important actors in global governance, China desires the development of a multipolar world order, while the EU is focused on multilateral arrangements. This difference in emphasis, coupled with the EU’s failure to develop a coherent external strategy, has undermined the potential of these two Powers to challenge US dominance. The question of multipolarity versus multilateralism requires further reflection in light of earlier chapters, especially on the WTO, where Chinese diplomats appear to have embraced multilateral mechanisms.

The final chapter by Panda examines China’s role in the BRICs and asks if China is taking the lead in the emerging global order. He claims that China is not looking to transform the global order yet, but that with time it may do so.

The concluding remarks by Wouters and Burnay raise three points about EU-China cooperation in the global order. First, the EU and China must enhance mutual knowledge and understanding. Second, they must develop a more mature and realistic partnership that engages constructively on the broad array of issues outlined in the 2003 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership document and that proactively reforms global governance. Third, the EU and China must continue their engagement through multilateral institutions to discuss bilateral and global concerns. For a policy orientated volume, these conclusions are too general to be of concrete use. Whilst the possibilities for developing the EU-China relationship are there and outlined in many of the chapters, the EU and China still appear to be talking past rather than to one another. Both powers seek to secure different outcomes in global politics and neither seems willing to give up much ground or has the incentives to do so. A coherent joint strategy with substantial ramifications for global governance does not appear to be the aim of either side at present.

The volume cannot hope to cover all aspects of China-EU relations in the context of global governance and in that regard the choice of key issue areas was a wise move. Nevertheless, key institutions, like the World Bank, actors, such as NGOs, and topics, including humanitarian interventions, are ignored. The security and politics section lacked a specific focus that tied the contributions together. Too few of the chapters adequately consider domestic actors and tend to opt for a state-centric view of world affairs that fails to consider the internal policy debates in both the EU and China. The topics covered received uneven treatment both in terms of the number of chapters in each section, as well as the length of each chapter and bibliography. The editors appear to have opted for collegial inclusivity at the expense of parsimony and comparability across the volume. In this regard, a more thorough discussion introducing each section would have helped tie the chapters together and advanced clearer policy recommendations. In addition, a theoretical section on global govern-

---

3 Ibid., p. 288.
4 Ibid., p. 329.
ance could have encouraged the contributors to adhere to a consistent framework of analysis. This would not only have helped the coherence of the volume, but would also have enhanced comparability between chapters and sections and lent the volume a longer term relevance for scholars of EU-China relations and global governance. That said, it could be argued that these recommendations would undermine the freedom of the contributors to approach their topic in their own way. The freedom afforded to the writers has allowed the editors to bring together a diverse and interesting range of views on EU-China relations. The volume contains valuable insights on a relationship that is too frequently ignored in the International Relations literature.